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‘New Left’ in the Post-Yugoslav Space: 
Issues, Sites, and Forms 
 
 
Igor Štiks1 
 
Introduction: What is the Post-Yugoslav ‘new left’? 
 
Seven new states have been formed where Yugoslavia once stood. It is a post-
Yugoslav, post-partition, post-conflict, and post-socialist landscape, one that seems to be 
in a never-ending ‘transition’ into free-market economies and liberal democracies.2 The 
appearance of what I will call here the post-Yugoslav ‘new left’ can be clearly detected in 
the post-2008 crisis period. The one salutary consequence of the 2008 financial crash was 
its delegitimizing effect on the previously almost unquestioned neoliberal dogma and on 
the idea that there is ‘no alternative’ to capitalism. When the shock wave hit the post-
socialist Balkans, it only added an additional blow to an already ruined landscape.  
After a series of devastating wars during the 1990s, which involved most of the 
post-Yugoslav states, came the post-war ‘recovery’ in the form of the usual neoliberal 
‘restructuring’. Privatization campaigns, besides lucrative deals for foreign companies 
and banks, gave rise to and consolidated a new economic oligarchy, tightly connected 
with the post-socialist political elite. De-industrialisation destroyed the economy. Up to 
130,000 lives were lost in the wars,3 and millions were displaced.4 According to Trading 
Economics, the unemployment in 2014-15 is between 12-13% in Slovenia, 14-15% in 
Montenegro, 16-20% in Croatia, 19-20% in Serbia, 27-28% in Macedonia, 43% in 
Bosnia, and 35% in Kosovo. In most countries, youth unemployment is usually around 
40-50%. Predictably, all post-Yugoslav states are highly indebted, with Croatia and 
																																																								
1 This research is supported by the Leverhulme Trust. 
2 See S. Horvat and I. Štiks (eds.), Welcome to the Desert of Post-Socialism: Radical Politics after 
Yugoslavia, (London: Verso, 2015). 
3 See Humanitarian Law Centre’s human losses database: http://www.hlc-rdc.org  
4 3.7 to 4 million left homes; more than 800,000 emigrated to various European countries and the US. For 
more details, see this graphic http://www.grida.no/graphicslib/collection/balkan-vital-graphics  
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Slovenia taking the lead, followed closely by Serbia.5 So, when the 2008 crash provoked 
worldwide outrage, it also opened a space for the first strong public articulation of an 
anti-capitalist critique—in the media and public sphere but also through various social 
and political actions—after two decades of absolute dominance of neoliberal and 
generally right-wing ideologies and actors.  
Before I define the ‘new left’, it first has to be distinguished from both the ‘old’ 
communist left and the ‘established’ post-socialist left. The ‘old’ left refers to the League 
of Communists of Yugoslavia that was established in 1919 as the Communist Party of 
Yugoslavia. It led the victorious and massive resistance movement during the Second 
World War and ran the Yugoslav federation from 1945 to 1990 when it disintegrated into 
its federal components. The League of Communists of each Yugoslav republic was then 
replaced with what I will call here the ‘established’ left of the post-socialist period. The 
former communist leagues rebranded themselves as ‘social-democratic’ or ‘socialist’ 
parties and embraced multi-party elections as well as the free market economy. Some of 
them were defeated at the first democratic elections in 1990, as in Slovenia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, and Macedonia. In all these countries, however, they would later 
win several elections. Some, however, remained in power throughout the 1990s as in 
Serbia (until 2000) or in Montenegro (until this very day).  
It has to be said immediately that the ideological shift of these nominally left 
parties towards the centre and their acceptance of neoliberal doctrine was complete. At 
best, they turned into ‘third-way’ parties and embraced neoliberal policies; at worst, they 
became immersed in nationalist campaigns and wars, as was the case with the ruling 
Socialist Party of Serbia of Slobodan Milošević. All of these parties retained, however, a 
significant support, which can be explained by a persistent emotional and ideological 
attachment to the ‘old’ party but also, in some countries, by opposition to nationalist and 
conservative right-wing politics. These parties—except in Serbia where Milošević’s 
legacy continues to blur the right-left divide and still plagues any attempts at genuine left 
politics—are usually seen as non-nationalistic and more open to the demands of ethnic or 
sexual minorities. The ‘new left’ opposes the established left’s neoliberal politics and 																																																								
5 Government debt to GDP: 80% in Croatia and Slovenia, 70% in Serbia. Source: Trading Economics. 
3		
takes a critical and balanced look at the historic communist Left and its heritage. 
However, it praises the ‘old’ left’s social achievements, especially its generous welfare 
provisions, and contrasts them to the current capitalist reality.  
So, what is this ‘new left’? This umbrella term—not without some similarities 
with the historic ‘new left’ of the 1960s—will be used here to encompass generally 
progressive political and social movements as well as ideologically profiled organizations 
that present themselves or are labelled as ‘radical left’. In other words, the term refers to a 
series of events, movements, and actors and not to a clearly distinct and organized 
political force. In this post-2008 period, spontaneous movements often erupt against 
general social injustices and concrete policies, expressing indignation without necessarily 
proclaiming a ‘leftist’ agenda; subsequently, however, the experience of social 
engagement and protests, as well as the radicalization of some protesters and parts of the 
general public, contribute to the rise of radical left organizations (groups, associations 
and even parties).  
The main characteristics of the post-Yugoslav ‘new left’ are: critique of electoral 
democracy, followed by experiments or advocacy of direct, participatory, and horizontal 
democracy; critique of the neoliberal capitalist transformation of the post-Yugoslav 
societies and the so called ‘transition’ resulting in huge inequalities and massive 
unemployment and poverty; critique of the conservative, religious, patriarchal, and 
nationalist ideological hegemony that accompanied and made possible that 
transformation; defence of common and public goods, including natural resources, and 
the remnants of the socialist welfare state against privatizations and profit-oriented 
exploitation; and, finally, an internationalist approach to the post-Yugoslav and wider 
Balkan region, often coupled with an anti-nationalist and antifascist attitude. Not all the 
formations labelled here as ‘new left’ necessarily contain all of these elements, but they 
usually combine at least some of them. Three analytical angles are used to examine the 
formation of the ‘new left’ and to analyse its actions and wider social and political 
relevance: the issues that define the new left’s agenda, the sites where their struggles 
occur, and the forms they take.  
 
The Issues 
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The Long Winter of Post-Socialist Discontent: Protests and Uprisings 
 
The diverse elements of the post-Yugoslav ‘new left’ have been formed in the 
eruptions of discontent and massive protest that recurrently hit this region. The usual 
issues are the general ‘corruption’ of the political elite, widespread poverty, and social 
despair. However, the trigger might be quite different in each case. In Croatia, in early 
2011, citizens were at first invited to protest against the government via Facebook. Very 
soon, up to 10,000 people were taking protest walks each evening for a whole month 
through the streets of Zagreb. In November and December 2012, we witnessed the 
Slovenian ‘uprisings’ triggered by a revolt in Maribor against the corrupt local mayor.6 
The protests spread rapidly all around the country, involving 10-15,000 people in 
Maribor, 20,000 in Ljubljana, and thousands in smaller cities. Those were the biggest 
protests in recent Slovenian history, and they clearly targeted both the right-wing 
government and the entire political elite. The protests eventually initiated a number of 
local activist networks and gave rise to an important left political party (see below).  
However, the biggest and most radical protests took place in Bosnia in February 
2014. In the North-Eastern city of Tuzla, unpaid licensed workers of the local detergent 
and furniture industry joined hands with students, the unemployed, and discontented 
citizens. On 4-5 February, the protests swelled and turned into violent clashes with the 
police. The local government building was set on fire. The next day, the protests spread 
to all major cities in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, one of Bosnia’s two entities 
(protests were marginal in the Serb Republic entity), including Sarajevo, where the 
municipal building and the state Presidency were also set on fire. These dramatic events, 
followed by a series of local government resignations, created the biggest challenge to the 
post-war Bosnian polity. Protesters soon set up plenums—citizens’ assemblies—in large 
and small cities as a form of spontaneous citizens’ self-organizing. Both ethno-nationalist 
elites and the international community were taken by surprise. Over the course of three 
months the protest and plenum movement lost its initial energy and things got back to 																																																								
6 G. Kirn, ‘Slovenia’s social uprising in the European crisis: Maribor as periphery from 1988 to 2012’, 
Stasis Journal 1 (2014), 106-129. 
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grim normality. However, these events gave rise to a series of movements struggling for 
‘social justice’. For the first time in Bosnia after the war, social issues such as inequalities 
and unemployment, as well as privatizations and corruption, overshadowed ethnic 
politics.7  
Finally, massive protests took place in Macedonia in summer 2015 against the 
right-wing government after the opposition released tape recordings evidencing massive 
corruption and criminality of the governing nationalist party and its leader. Street protests 
were reinforced by the student movement as well as by participation of citizens of all 
ethnic backgrounds.  
 
Struggle for the Commons: City, Nature, Education 
 
 Privatizations, neglect, or destruction of public goods continue to galvanize public 
opinion, prompting massive mobilizations. Many voices unite in criticizing the 
inequalities of social status, access to public services, education and health, general 
citizens’ rights, quality of living in urban space, and the exploitation of natural 
resources.8 
 Under the general banner of ‘Right to the City’ (Pravo na Grad), important 
movements formed across the post-Yugoslav region involving individuals of various 
political stripes, mostly ranging from left-liberal to radical left. Access to the very space 
where one lives—squares, parks, streets, and buildings—affects huge swaths of society 
and is likely to provoke an emotional as well as political reaction. The Right to the City 
movement grew significantly in Zagreb in 2009-11 in opposition to a major development 
project that altered a pedestrian street (Varšavska ulica) and one of the main downtown 
squares (Cvjetni trg). Protesters denounced corruption, gentrification and enclosures as 
well as the nexus between private capital and the city government. In Bosnia-
Herzegovina, in Banja Luka, a movement developed in 2012 to oppose the destruction of 																																																								
7 More on the protests and their aftermath in D. Arsenijević (ed.), Unbribable Bosnia-Herzegovina: The 
Fight for the Commons, (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2014). 
8 The Commons Working Group, ‘The Struggle for the Commons in the Balkans’ in V. Bibić, A. Milat, S. 
Horvat and I. Štiks (eds.), The Balkan Forum: Situations, Struggles, Strategies (Zagreb: Bijeli Val, 2014), 
pp. 9-34. 
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a park (Picin park) and its transformation into a housing complex. Like the Zagreb 
movement, it failed in its attempts but it resulted in the first public challenges to the 
regimes as well as to neoliberal hegemony.  
 We can observe a similar scenario in Belgrade where urban activists try to prevent 
the development of the ‘Belgrade Waterfront’ project. Supported fully and financially by 
the Serbian government, an Emirati investor plans to transform an enormous area in 
downtown Belgrade on the Sava riverbank into a zone of luxurious apartments and 
services. The dubious project, followed by a number of irregularities and illegal actions, 
provoked public outrage. The mobilization around the banner ‘Ne da(vi)mo Belgrade’ 
(Don’t Drown Belgrade) is not a movement of the left per se and its participants avoid 
presenting themselves as leftists. However, their direct inspiration by left urban 
movements in the region, insistence on urban commons, as well as the unavoidable 
critique of the neoliberal investor-oriented policies, place them, in my view, among the 
post-Yugoslav ‘new left’.  
 In a similar fashion, some initiatives fighting against the destruction of natural 
resources developed as wider citizens’ movements. The movement ‘Srdj is ours’ (Srdj je 
naš), in 2010-13, attempted to prevent the privatization of parts of the Srdj hill in 
Dubrovnik and the development of golf courses. In Montenegro, a micro movement in 
Beranselo against the garbage landfill polluting natural resources had strong resonance 
throughout the country. Recently, the local activist network ‘Bosnian Spring’ in Bihać, 
formed during the 2014 protests, succeeded in preventing commercial exploitation of the 
river Una.  
 Besides these struggles in defence of urban and natural commons, the most 
important movement of the ‘new left’ appeared in opposition to commercialization and 
privatization of higher education. By defending the idea that education is a common good 
that should be available to everyone, strong student movements, experimenting with 
direct democracy, developed in almost all post-Yugoslav states. The crucial event was the 
occupation of Croatian universities in April and November 2009 where the ‘plenums’—
general assemblies of students, professors, and citizens—formed and articulated both the 
movement itself and a general critique of political oligarchies and representative multi-
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party regimes as well as the capitalist economic system.9 The occupation offered both 
the political rhetoric and organizational tools for all future student struggles in this 
region.10 Similar occupations occurred later in Ljubljana in 2011 and in Belgrade in 2011 
and 2014 and, finally, in Macedonia in 2014-15. Macedonian students and professors not 
only massively protested in the streets against the government’s reforms of the 
educational system, but set up plenums and declared them ‘free autonomous zones’. 
Student protest has taken place in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Kosovo as well. 
 
Workers’ Activism: From Strikes to Occupations 
 
Recently, the Croatian rock band Hladno Pivo released a song about the post-
socialist privatizations of industries, factories, and firms previously owned by the 
workers themselves under the Yugoslav system of self-management. The refrain goes as 
follows: God, Homeland, Nation / All freeze! / This is privatization! / Free up space / For 
‘200 families’. The song nicely captures the right-wing conservative ideology (God, 
Homeland, Nation) that demobilized any opposition (All freeze!) to the state-run 
privatization process whose final outcome was supposed to be, as famously announced 
by the Croatian nationalist president Franjo Tudjman (1990-99), the creation of 200 
wealthiest families. These ‘200 families’ were those close to his party to whom the 
former social property was given almost for free. The industries collapsed, workers were 
laid off, and the former factory buildings and office spaces mostly sold as real estate. A 
similar scenario occurred in almost all former Yugoslav republics, with differences 
resulting from diverse political and social contexts. These privatization policies were only 
occasionally resisted, especially rarely during the war years of the 1990s.11 Unions 
proved either corrupt or too close to the political parties or simply incapable of leading 
																																																								
9 See The Occupation Cookbook, or the Model of the Occupation of the Faculty of Humanities and Social 
Sciences in Zagreb (New York: Minorcompositions, 2011). 
10 See J. Baćević, ‘‘They had sex, drugs and rock ‘n’ roll; we’ll have mini-jobs and loans to pay’: 
Transition, Social Change and Student Movements in the Post-Yugoslav region’, in Horvat and Štiks (eds.), 
Welcome to the Desert of Post-Socialism, pp. 223-41. 
11 See, for example, G. Musić, Radnička klasa Srbije u tranziciji 1988-2013 [Serbia’s Working Class in 
Transition, 1988-2013], (Belgrade: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 2013). 
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meaningful workers’ struggles, apart from sporadic protests.12 Only recently can one 
observe their more vocal opposition to new neoliberal labour laws (as in Serbia in 2014 
and Bosnia in 2015).  
A new phase of workers’ activism and an alternative type of organizing can be 
seen, however, over the last decade, as some workers’ initiatives joined forces with 
student and urban movements, leftist groups, prominent individuals, artists and 
intellectuals.13 Workers of some privatized or bankrupt firms and factories staged public 
protests to alert the public to their problems. At the same time they required the judiciary 
and the state to react, to pay their wage arrears and pension contributions or to re-start 
production. This was the case of female workers of the Zagreb textile factory Kamensko 
and the Tuzla workers, most notably from the detergent factory Dita. Whereas the 
Kamensko workers failed in their attempts to win their workplaces back, Dita workers 
managed to preserve the machinery, get the judiciary to act, and re-start production in 
summer 2015.14 In another case of takeover in northern Croatia, workers of Itas-
Prvomajska occupied their bankrupt factory, re-started production, and continued to 
experiment with self-management and direct worker-ownership. In some other cases, 
such as the Petrokemija factory in Kutina, Croatian workers fight to keep the state as the 
majority owner with stronger worker representation on the management board. In Serbia, 
on the other hand, the pharmaceutical company Jugoremedija from Zrenjanin opted for a 
workers’ shareholding model.15  
 
The Sites 
 
																																																								
12 See M. Grdešić, ‘Workers and Unions after Yugoslavia’, in Horvat and Štiks (eds.), Welcome to the 
Desert of Post-Socialism, pp. 65-81 and M. Ivandić and I. Livada, ‘The Lines of (Dis)Continuity: Forms 
and Methods of Labour Struggle in Croatia 1990-2014, Research Paper Series of Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung 
Southeast Europe No.3 (Belgrade: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 2015).     
13 Working Group on Workers’ Struggles, ‘Mapping of Workers’ Struggles: The Position of Workers in 
Post-Socialist Balkans’, in V. Bibić, A. Milat, S. Horvat and I. Štiks (eds.), The Balkan Forum, pp. 35-44. 
14 E. M. Jukić, 'Workers' Takeover Saves Iconic Bosnian Firm', Balkan Insight, 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/workers-takeover-saves-tuzla-s-iconic-detergent-company  
15 For both cases, see M. G. Kraft, ‘Insurrections in the Balkans: From Workers and Students to New 
Political Subjectivities’, in Horvat and Štiks (eds.), Welcome to the Desert, pp. 199-222.
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To understand the events I describe above, we have to further examine where the 
various forces of the ‘new left’ are likely to emerge and act. The issues related to urban 
policies and management provoked an effective resistance, from obstructions of 
development projects (chaining to the trees in Varšavska to human-chain action to protect 
a modernist building from destruction in Skopje, for instance), to street performances and 
play-like interventions of the Right to the City movements in Zagreb and Belgrade. 
Protests would often take the form of marches, from the 2011 Zagreb walks and the 
walks of the Kamensko workers, to the Banja Luka ‘walkers’ opposing urban devastation.  
The most privileged ‘indoor’ spaces for the ‘new left’ remain the universities. A 
series of occupations of universities’ premises opened up the sites where participants 
protested the reforms of higher education, discussed the content and burning issues of 
their struggles, and experimented with what they professed, namely with alternative type 
of democratic horizontal decision-making and participatory organizing. The student 
plenums inspired the spread of much larger Bosnian plenums that, for a couple of months 
in 2014, were organized in cultural and social centres, theatres, cinemas, and in the open 
air with massive participation of citizens from all walks of life.  
Occupation of cinemas, theatres, and cultural institutions as part of the struggles 
for beni comuni (common goods), as in Italy and Greece, is not widespread, apart from 
one notable exception. In November 2014, Belgrade activists and artists occupied the 
privatized and closed-down Zvezda cinema. The leading figures among the occupiers 
refused to be seen as belonging to the ‘left’ and portrayed their actions as almost 
apolitical interest in cinema. However, based on the methods they used, protest 
iconography, and the questions raised (privatization of culture as common good), their 
action can be broadly placed within the contours of the ‘new left’ as described here. The 
occupation highlighted also another dimension, which is the relationship of the ‘new left’ 
movements to the cultural sphere and general intellectual activities. Many left-wing 
counter-hegemonic efforts, whose aim is to re-legitimize left discourse within the 
population at large, often come in forms of festivals and larger gatherings combining 
cultural content with political debates in open public spaces. Some of the most prominent 
events of this kind are the Subversive (Film) Festival in Zagreb, the Festival of 
Alternatives and the Left - Fališ in Šibenik (Croatia), the Open University in Bosnia-
10		
Herzegovina, and the Workers and Punks’ University with its May Day School in 
Ljubljana. 
 
The Forms 
 
The activities of the ‘new left’ come for the most part in the following forms: 
media activism, petitions and referendum initiatives, protests, plenums, platforms, NGOs 
and, finally, political parties.  
In the period since 2008, leftist ideas have gained a much wider acceptance, 
especially in Slovenia and Croatia and, to a certain extent, in Bosnia and Macedonia. This 
is primarily due to the emergence of a series of left-oriented media, newspapers, internet 
websites and portals and, unavoidably, the use of social media. To name just a few, from 
Mladina in Slovenia, Le Monde diplomatique in Croatia and, as of recently, in Serbia, 
web portals Mašina (Serbia), Slobodni Filozofski and Bilten (Croatia), newspapers Zarez 
and Novosti (Croatia) to the English language websites LeftEast (based in Romania and 
providing a communication space for the all-Balkan left). 
Croatia’s ‘new left’ actors are at the forefront when it comes to the use of 
petitions and referendum initiatives. They collected the required number of signatures—
10% of eligible voters—for a referendum on the Labour law in 2010, against the 
monetization (concessions) of the highways and against outsourcing in the public sector 
in 2014.16 The local referendum in Dubrovnik on the golf course development on Srdj 
hill succeeded but to no avail (the voter turnout was less than 50%)17 Furthermore, there 
was a huge mobilization of various left and liberal organizations to vote ‘no’ in the 
referendum against the same-sex marriages. The referendum was successful (about one 
million people voted ‘yes’), although the turnout was only 38% (unlike at the local level, 
																																																								
16 The referendums did not take place. The Constitutional Court decided that the initiatives were not in 
accordance with the Constitution. See The Constitutional Court of Croatia’s webpage, www.usud.hr  
17 Balkan Insight, ‘Dubrovnik to Build Gold Resort Despite Protests’, 31 July 2013, 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/dubrovnik-golf-park-to-go-ahead  
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at the state level there is no minimal turnout). However, some 500,000 people did 
mobilize and voted against this homophobic initiative.18 
The ‘new left’ is usually the driving force behind student protests as well as 
behind the defence of the commons and urban space. Its presence is unavoidable in larger 
protests such as the Facebook protests, the Slovenian ‘uprisings’, and the Bosnian 
protests. Some of these protest movements opted for the plenum form, most notably 
students in Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Macedonia, and protesters in Bosnia. The plenum 
as direct democratic body turned to be a crucial form of engagement and radicalization of 
the ‘new left’ actors. Despite polemics between advocates of direct democracy and those 
asking for more structured political organizations, it is beyond doubt that the ‘new left’ is 
marked by its involvement in democratic innovations and participation.19  
 Some actors of the ‘new left’ do form sustainable and more operational structures 
in the form of platforms, small political groups, and NGOs. We should mention, to name 
just some of the most prominent, the Initiative for Democratic Socialism in Slovenia, 
BRID (Organization for Workers’ Initiative and Democratization), Academic Solidarity, 
and Centre for Workers’ Studies (CRS) in Croatia, Marks 21, Anarcho-syndicalist 
initiative, Centre for Politics of Emancipation (CPE), and the platform of leftist 
organizations The Left Summit in Serbia, Bosnian Spring (Bihać) and The Left (Tuzla) in 
Bosnia, and The leftist movement ‘Solidarity’ in Macedonia.  
Finally, the post-Yugoslav ‘new left’ cannot avoid the question of its participation 
in electoral politics and thus of the formation of political parties. So far, the 
transformation of the ‘new left’ movements into political parties and successful electoral 
campaigns has been effective only in Slovenia.20 The United Left (Združena levica), 																																																								
18 ‘Croatians Vote to Ban Gay Marriage’, The Guardian (1 December 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/01/croatia-vote-ban-gay-marriage-referendum  
19 Democratisation and Participation Working Group, ‘Between Institutional and Non-Institutional Forms 
of Democratic Organizing: Towards Revolutionary Change’, in V. Bibić, A. Milat, S. Horvat and I. Štiks 
(eds.), The Balkan forum, pp. 68-85. 
20 A different case—which should be analyzed separately—is that of the ‘Self-determination Movement!’ 
(Levizja Vetevendosje!) in Kosovo, which has a strong parliamentary presence (it won 13.5% of votes in 
the parliamentary elections and currently holds 16 seats out of 120). One of its leaders became mayor of 
Pristina in 2013. It is a broad popular movement whose leftist social and economic programme, anti-
corruption zeal, rejection of foreign supervision, and opposition to privatizations—it recurrently organizes 
protests that sometimes turn violent—is coupled with nationalist rhetoric such as demands for the 
unification of Albania and Kosovo and insensitivity towards minorities, especially the Serbs. 
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inspired by parties such as Podemos and SYRIZA, was formed in 2014 out of three small 
leftist initiatives and parties. At the European elections in 2014, the ZL already won 5.5% 
of the votes (not enough to enter the European Parliament), but a couple of months later, 
it scored 6% at the Slovenian elections and won 6 parliamentary seats.21 In Croatia, in 
spite of a myriad of initiatives and leftist activism, a similar electoral success has not 
been produced. There, the Workers’ Front represents so far the most serious attempt to 
form a party for the future parliamentary and local elections. In other post-Yugoslav 
states, similar attempts did not occur so far or failed. 
 
Conclusion: Successes and Failures of the Post-Yugoslav ‘New Left’ 
 
 Since 2008, the ‘new left’ forces have definitely stepped onto the political and 
social stage of the post-Yugoslav societies. They experienced some successes, the first 
one being the very existence of a new internationally connected and modern left ready to 
struggle against the post-socialist predicament. Although largely politically unsuccessful, 
the plenums formed and functioned at the universities and in the Bosnian cities, 
movements struggling for the commons developed across the region, and significant 
street protests occurred. Where various actors of the new left joined forces, as in Tuzla in 
February 2014, the outcome was impressive and produced a political earthquake. The 
‘new left’ definitely challenged nationalist, conservative, and neoliberal hegemony and 
opened a space for public presence of leftist ideas via the media, festivals, and public 
gatherings.  
 However, its failures are many. The single-issue struggles are not necessarily 
connected. Urban initiatives are not always interested in workers’ struggles, while 
students and professors often fail to reach beyond academia. Attempts to build a 
sustainable and wider movement or stronger political parties capable of challenging the 
established parties or influencing municipal, regional and state politics have so far proved 
unsuccessful.  
 In short, the ‘new left’ made a surprise breakthrough in the region marked by a 																																																								
21 Republic of Slovenia, State Election Commission: http://volitve.gov.si/dz2014/en/  
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heavy legacy of defeated socialism, disintegrated Yugoslavia, destructive wars, and harsh 
capitalist ‘transition’. As elsewhere, its various components in their respective societies 
will become a major political and historical force when they leave this legacy behind and 
start to create the conditions for a future shaped according to their ideals. 	
